Brief Chronology of Railroad History, with Passenger Emhpasis

 Brief Chronology of Railroad History, With Passenger Emphasis

Brief Chronology of Railroad History, With Passenger Emphasis

Updated August 1, 2006

Knowing the history of U.S. railroading, including the railroads’ use of intercity passenger rail to attract and keep big freight shippers rather than as a profit center, can be helpful in understanding the current situation and debating future policy.  Most of the following was compiled in October, 2003, by NARP Executive Director Ross B. Capon, but we continue to add important historical facts as time permits. The books and reports quoted are excellent factual sources, whether or not you agree with their spin on every point.  They are listed at the end, with numbers corresponding to the footnotes in the text below.

1825 – First steam engine to work a public railway (George Stephenson’s Locomotion, Stockton and Darlington Railway, Britain).  “The car ‘Experiment’ passes into history as the first type of railway passenger coach. It belongs to a stage coach line, the managers of which have an agreement with the Stockton and Darlington Company to run it upon the road with the provision that the side track shall always be taken when a train of coal wagons comes into view.  Passengers are carried at so much each, the same as on the stage line, and it is drawn by horses, as the locomotive service is exclusively for freight.”

1827 – Baltimore & Ohio founded, opens horse-drawn service to Ellicott’s Mills (now Ellicott City), Maryland, albeit with horses.

1830 – First successful U.S. steam line, South Carolina Railroad, whose first locomotive Best Friend of Charleston hauled an inaugural train on Christmas Day.
1831 – De Witt Clinton makes maiden run hauling train on Mohawk and Hudson from Albany to Schenectady, 14 miles, in 46 minutes, on August 9.

1838 – “Bed-carriages,” precursor of the sleeping car, appear (London-Birmingham; London-Lancashire)

1848 – Chicago gets its first railroad

1850 – Great Western gives Queen Victoria the first known on-board bathroom (to run on “a railway carriage running over any appreciable distance…The lavatory basin was almost modern but the pedestal, heavily upholstered to protect Her Majesty’s knees should she stumble, contained but a humble pot”)2

1850s – Completion of New York Central and Pennsylvania mainlines between Chicago and the East Coast

1856 – Legality of bridging the Mississippi established:  Rock Island Line subsidiary completes first Mississippi River bridge, April 22.  Steamboat Effie Afton crashes against the bridge (some witnesses said intentionally). Steamboat owners sued for damages.  “The Rock Island line hired Abraham Lincoln to defend itself and [its bridge-building subsidiary].  The result was a [9-3] verdict for the railroad and the bridge…This besting of the riverboat interests assured Chicago’s access to the West…By mid-century, railroads were carrying more people than any other form of transport in America.” 3

1858-9 – Three cars with berths (converted by George Pullman from coaches) run on the Chicago and Alton Railroad

1865 – Prototype of what would become the standard Pullman sleeper for generations; converts into seats for daytime service

1867 – The first dining car (Great Western Railway, Canada)

1869 – Completion of first U.S. transcontinental railroad

1887 – Interstate Commerce Act creates the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), prescribing “‘thou shalt nots’ without any guidance how and in what manner the industry should operate.  The [four-page] act’s thrust was to make railroads post their rates publicly and charge them to all customers.  But in a monumental passing of the buck, Congress directed its new child only to make sure railroad charges were ‘reasonable and just,’ without guidelines or punishment if the haughty railroads failed to comply.  Moreover, by holding that no one who had worked for a railroad could be a commissioner, it banned most of those who really understood how this intricate megabusiness operated…Were the five ICC commissioners to legislate, to administer, or judge?  The act…really did not say.  So lawyers all, they fell back on what they knew.  Choosing not to set down their own rules or to superimpose an overall plan…the commissioners decided to judge each complaint case by case…The attempts of such a puny commission to regulate a huge industry would soon create an impossible bottleneck.  A railroad that wanted to increase what it charged for shipping washboards and that was trying to comply with the law would have to wait months for an ICC okay.  In a day when railroads competed mainly against one another, such a delay was at best inconvenient.  Later, when they vied with unregulated truckers—who could steal away rail business by charging rates at will, such a time lag would prove catastrophic.  In 1903, a crescendo of public pressure prompted Congress to outlaw any rate a shipper or carrier charged other than the one it filed with the ICC.” 4

1895 – “The passenger train probably reached its peak share around the mid-1890s when it is thought to have provided some 95% of intercity trips.”5

1897 – Supreme Court rules against any agreements among railroads for maintaining rates. “For fifteen years, rail managers had been groping for some way to [impose stability on railroad rates] within the strictures of the Interstate Commerce Act…In December 1890 the western roads made another attempt by forming an advisory board composed of the president and one director from each road.  The idea was to have this board enforce all agreements for maintaining rates, but in 1897 the Supreme Court ruled any such agreement illegal under the Sherman Antitrust Act.  For many railroad men this decision killed off any hope of keeping rates stable” (page 92)7.

1906 – Railroads “lost the greatest battle in their history, and, with it, the right to control their own industry…The ICC, after two decades of powerlessness, began its effective life on June 19, 1906, when the Hepburn Act took effect.  In 1907, the act’s first full year of application, formal complaints filed by shippers increased six-fold.  So virulent was the anti railroad fever in the heartland that constituents of Senator William Peters Hepburn, the bill’s sponsor, turned him out of office in his next election for not restricting the railroads even more.”4

December, 1906 – ICC, perhaps encouraged by President Theodore Roosevelt, begins investigation of “consolidations and combinations of carriers, relations between such carriers, and community of interests therein, their rates, facilities, and practices.”  Investigation focuses only on Harriman roads, and heavily on “the controversial reorganization of the Alton seven years earlier…The Alton played no role worthy of notice in the existing relations among carriers and was a minor line in the modern rail network.  However, its reorganization was by far the most questionable episode in Harriman’s career, the Achilles heel of his reputation as a financier” (page 172-3)7.

1906-18 – “Coalitions of national shippers gained control of the ICC with passage of the Hepburn Act of 1906 and the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910.  The shippers used their power to freeze freight and passenger rates during a period of price inflation.  These measures weakened the earning power of the nation’s railroads and crippled their ability to raise capital.”6

June 1911 – Union Pacific wins circuit ruling.  UP control of Southern Pacific is found not to violate the Sherman Act.  The small amount of competitive traffic was a “controlling and decisive consideration.”  Defense had “contended that UP and SP competed for a tiny amount of traffic—less than 1% of the SP’s total tonnage for 1901, and 3.1% of the UP’s tonnage—and that the merger itself had little effect because SP virtually monopoliozed California traffic before the merger” (pages 193-4)7

December 1912 – Supreme Court rules against UP (forcing unmerger with SP), sending “chills shuddering down the spine of every rail executive in the nation…The fact that in this case rates had not advanced and huge sums had been spent to improve service did not sway the court.  What the merged systems had actually done during the past decade mattered less to the justices than their possession of the potential power to do something else.  The beauty of law, at least to lawyers and judges, is that it can be dealt with in terms of the private world of its own inner logic regardless of its fit with social realities or its repercussions on society” (page 195)7.

1916 – U.S. law reduces railroad worker day from ten to eight hours

“By 1917…the politics of rail had become a three-cornered hat dance among managers, shippers, and labor in which the shippers had captured the ICC and labor had gained the backing, however unwilling, of the administration.  The carriers, with no one in their corner, had lost control over both rates and wages at a time when war orders sent prices rocketing upward and the crush of traffic wore down their physical plant at an alarming rate.  Money for maintenance and improvements was urgently needed, but where was it to come from?  The capital market was gorged with government issues, and rail securities held little appeal for investors as long as the ICC held their revenues in check and prices continued their upward spiral…Weak roads had no money for betterments or way to get it; stronger roads hesitated to spend their funds when costs were high and income low.”7

April, 1917 – U.S. enters World War I, railroads face “rapidly rising freight traffic…Soon choked yards and stranded trains tied up so many cars that shippers across the country could not obtain empty cars.” Rail leaders set up coordinating councils to solve the problem, without success.

“A growing cry to unify the rail system must have made managers weep with frustration, especially since some of the loudest howlers were those who had done so much to bar the carriers from operating in a unified way…On December 26 [1917, President] Wilson released a proclamation placing all rail and water systems under federal control…’The strong arm of government authority,’ declared one approving ICC commissioner, ‘is essential if the transportation system is to be radically improved.’  No doubt the irony of this statement eluded him entirely.  What federal control did above all else was free the railroads from both the coils of state regulation and what Albro Martin has aptly called ‘the palsied hand of the ICC.’…Now that the government was responsible for [the railroads’] performance, it could not help but view their problems in a mores sympathetic light.  Another analogy impressed itself on one observer, who noted that the government was seeking the very objective of unified, efficient transportation Harriman had endeavored to create until he ran against ‘the impossible snag of public opinon.’”7

December 26, 1917 – President Wilson by executive order established the United States Railway Administration (USRA), appointing Secretary of Commerce William McAdoo as director general of railroad. “Decisions were made by councils of railroad executives in consultation with McAdoo…McAdoo ordered that each railroad eliminate unessential passenger service. He also prohibited competitive passenger service between railroads…To the extent feasible, railroads also would jointly use passenger terminals and city ticket offices, closing those made redundant…”6

1918 – McAdoo “granted skilled railroad workers 30% wage increases to keep them from leaving railroad shops and trains for more lucrative manufacturing jobs [putting] daily wages to 62.5% above those in 1916. McAdoo raised both freight and passenger rates about 40% in partial compensation.”6  User protests result only in elimination of the sleeper surcharge.

March, 1920 – Resisting labor demands for nationalization, and McAdoo’s recommendation that government control continue another five years, Congress “returned the nation’s railroads to private operation with reformed regulatory oversight.”** (Seeing what was coming, McAdoo in January 1919 had resigned in favor of Santa Fe Board Chairman Walker D. Hines “who allegedly was contemptuous of labor and shipper interests…Labor’s mood turned ugly upon learning of Congress’s intent to return the roads to private control. It appears that managers needed a labor force with a better attitude and gave labor large concessions in an attempt to get it…The agreements left the railroads headed for a $1.2 billion operating deficit. Higher rates were needed, but Hines refused to further anger users. Instead, he slashed the 1919 maintenance program and passed the onus of rate increases on to the new ICC.  When the USRA returned the railroads to private control in March, 1920, deferred maintenance and the need for higher rates for both freight and passenger service topped the agenda of railroad managers.”6

1920 – Railroads carry 1.27 billion passengers, 47.4 billion passenger-miles5

– Transportation Act of 1920:
• Within limits, ICC is to allow railways to increase rates.
• Railroads encouraged to enter into pooling agreements for efficiency.
• Cross subsidies discouraged, including coach vs. sleeping car

1920s—“Growing automobile ownership and improved highways during the 1920s explain much of the loss of market share during the decade, but despite some successes, railroad management failures in pricing, investments, and cost control played significant roles.”6

Early 1920s – “Rather than improving on passenger efficiencies introduced by the USRA, or even maintaining such efficiencies, [railroads] intended to increase passenger costs even further and make the passengers pay for the increased costs.  Although passengers never asked for such expensive items as ostentatious city terminals and duplicate luxury services, the ICC gave its blessing to fare increases with the hope that passengers would finance such unproductive debt and expenses. ”6

August 1920 – With ICC approval, railroads increased one-way fare from 3.0 to 3.6 cents per passenger-mile, and reimposed the Pullman surcharge that USRA had briefly applied during World War I (about 0.5 cents a passenger-mile) going to the railroads. Railroads thought demand was inelastic, but “the drop in revenues that began in 1921 reflected more than a temporary downturn in the economy. It reflected the intensification of economic and competitive trends that had set in after 1910…In 1920 average Americans used autos 50 miles per year for intercity travel, while they used trains 450 miles per year. Just ten years later the average American drove 1,691 miles per year in intercity travel but rode only 219 miles per year on the train. By this time the American passenger train failed to earn its operating expenses, according to ICC statistics. ”6

1921—“No one came away happy either with their settlement [federal funds for any maintenance not performed (during federal control) for railroads with valid claims] or with the new mood in Washington, which promised a long row over the Transportation Act. An embittered Julius Kruttschnitt [Southern Pacific executive] hauled out his beloved statistical cannons and fired a parting salvo at federal control.  The root of the problem in his view was forcing the carriers ‘to spend more in increased wages than they were able to earn from increased rates.’  Using adjusted prices, still a novelty to many people in his day, Kruttschnitt came up with some revealing figures.  Between 1900 and 1917 wholesale prices rose 120% while freight rates declined one percent.  By July 1920, both wholesale prices and railroad wages were 240% higher than in 1900; freight rates had risen only 30%.  An increase granted in September 1920 pushed rates up to 74%, and prices had fallen to 180% higher than 1900, but the gap was still huge.  Nothing rankled Kruttschnitt more than the charge that the business depression of 1921 was caused by high rail rates and inefficient railroad management.  He blasted those businessmen who failed to see the burden thrust on the carriers by the legacy of federal control.  ‘Never before in the history of railroads has the pressure for advanced methods been so great as now,’ he insisted, ‘and never before have managers, imbued with the sentiments of the late Mr. Harriman,—‘Never dissatisfied, always unsatisfied,’—responded more heartily.’” (page 241)7.

1930 – “Passenger service began to produce a net deficit for the railroads.”5

1930s – “The Pennsylvania Railroad had spent $126 million during the height of the Depression to electrify 1,405 miles of trackage, including those between New York and Washington, using government loan guarantees provided by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.”10

1935 – “The PRR’s new electric passenger express cut the [New York-Washington] schedule from four hours fifteen minutes to three hours forty-five minutes. ”10

World War II – “Restrictions on commercial aviation and automobile travel at a time of high war-related demand for intercity transportation brought the number of passengers back to the level of the early 1920s and actually caused passenger-miles to reach double the 1920 level.  In 1944, the railroads carried 916 million passengers for 95.7 billion passenger-miles.  For four consecutive years, 1942 through 1945, the railroads had positive earnings from their passenger service.”5

1942 – Taxes on freight transportation and federal ticket taxes on all modes of travel as follows: 
1941:  5%; 
1942 and 1954-62:  10%; 
1943-53:  15%;
1962-68:  5% air only 
1971:  8% air only
During 1941-62, $4.6 billion were collected, of which 43.9% came from rail passengers. All of this ($2 billion) went to general funds. “Airport and airway development costs incurred prior to the assessment of user charges in 1971 have been treated as sunk costs, none of which have been or will be paid for by air carriers and other system users…these sunk costs total $15.8 billion.”12

Late 1940s – Railroads reequip their passenger fleets and existing schedules with diesels and stainless steel or aluminum equipment, but little or nothing to develop the air-competitive corridors

1949 – Passenger deficit reaches $650 million, “almost half (48.6%) the railway net 
revenue from freight.”5

Mid 1950s – “[New York Central President Alfred] Perlman gave me a million extra trainmiles a year…we put on five round-trips a day between Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, and Cincinnati, and we gutted our prices, and we did a good job. Business was phenomenal! We started out with three or four coaches on our train—64-seaters—and we found we had to raise it up to 10, 12, 14 coaches on a train, two diners, plus the head-end equipment, and we really did a knock-down, drag-out business…[But] Cincinnati Union Terminal killed us. We wound up contributing $4.50 from every ticket to C.U.T. We need to figure out how to get around those terminal expenses, because they’re monstrous.”13
Mid 1950s – State regulatory authorities kill successful excursion trains with cheap fares (such as New York-Syracuse), afraid that they were drawing passengers off second-tier long-distance trains NYC was trying to discontinue, even though the latter carried a tiny fraction of passengers in the markets the excursion trains served.13

1958 – “The Transportation Act of 1958 shifted jurisdiction over most intercity passenger train services away from state regulatory boards, which had often proven more sympathetic to pleas for preserving passenger trains than they had to concerns about railroad profitability.  Such authority was now delegated to the ICC, which was instructed to weigh both the ‘public convenience and necessity’ of a passenger train service and the possibility that ongoing losses from its continued operation would form an ‘undue burden on interstate commerce.’  In place of lengthy proceedings before one or more state regulatory tribunals, the 1958 act created a streamlined and uniform process…”10

1958 – ICC releases “a staff report [Railroad Passenger Train Deficit:  Docket #31954 by examiner Howard Hosmer]…that attributed declining ridership and revenues to an inexorable shift in consumer demand towards the better transportation technology offered by aviation and automobiles.  The report noted that America’s railroads had invested ‘about half a billion dollars’ in new passenger train equipment between 1947 and 1956, while traffic declined precipitously.”  It was, of course, beyond the purview of the report to consider the outcome of a different mix of investment that included government funding and an emphasis on corridor development.10

April, 1959 – Trains magazine’s seminal “Who shot the passenger train?” issue in which editor David P. Morgan dissects in detail—and 38 pages—everything that “went wrong” plus “what can be done.”  One example of anti-rail bias in public policy:  New York Central in 1950 spent $5 million to build Toledo’s brand-new Central Union Terminal.  “Today the structure represents an investment of $4,856,745 and in the year 1956 land and property taxes totaling $42,745 were paid on it.  Fourteen miles from downtown is the Toledo Express Airport…built entirely with city funds…completed in 1955.  In 1957, it had an operating deficit of $16,366…or, with annual depreciation, $103,217.  Moreover, there is the matter of debt service. The airport, valued at $3,865,228, was financed out of city funds as well as a municipal improvement fund and a bond issue.  No interest on the amount borrowed is included in the airport statement, but at the 2½ per cent rate applicable, the amount is $96,631 – which boosts the deficit to $199,848.  No taxes are levied upon the publicly owned airport, of course, but if it were a private concern taxed at current rates the bill would be $45,005.  This brings the 1957 deficit to $244,853.”

1961 – Senate Commerce Committee’s Doyle Report floats concept of a single nationwide entity for rail passenger service

1965 – High Speed Ground Transportation Act established Office of High-Speed Ground Transportation (OHSGT), initially in Commerce Department;

1967—Department of Transportation is created, OHSGT becomes part of it. A contract is “executed with the Pennsylvania Railroad…OHSGT committed to invest $6.7 million, later raised to $11 million, to support the PRR’s acquisition of a new generation of electric-powered, self-propelled passenger cars that could run at 160 miles per hour and make the trip from midtown Manhattan to Capitol Hill in under three hours.”10

February 1, 1968 – New York Central and Pennsylvania Railroads merge into Penn Central.  Alfred Perlman, president of New York Central and Penn Central, later testifies before a Senate Commerce subcommittee that both railroads “were, prior to merger, the largest handlers of mail in the United States.  Just about the time of the merger, the Post Office Department diverted mail from rail passenger trains to air and other means, causing [railroads] a tremendous loss in revenue.  Not only were we faced with the loss of revenues, but the thousands of employees on our payroll engaged in the handling of mail had to be kept on the payroll or paid off.  The Government didn’t pay off the mail handlers.  Yet the passenger trains which had been handling the mail were not permitted to be discontinued under what amounted to a freeze on discontinuances by the ICC.”17

July 16, 1969 – ICC releases Investigation of Costs of Intercity Rail Passenger Service, which concludes “‘significant segments of the remaining intercity service, except for rail service in high density population corridors…will not survive the next few years without a major change in Federal and carrier policies…Should the public need for such service warrant retention of these trains that cannot be operated without significant losses, we would support a program of Federal aid to the carriers.’  These conclusions…were seen…as a clear threat by the ICC to allow an accelerated discontinuance of service unless a method for supporting the losses was found.  Congress and the Administration got the message.”17

September, 1969 – U.S. DOT informally presents “Railpax” concept to Senate Commerce Committee

January, 1970 – Penn Central seeks to eliminate the 34 remaining long-distance trains west of Harrisburg and Buffalo, claiming it would save $23 million annually17

January, 1970 – U.S. DOT announces its intention to submit to Congress a legislative recommendation on Railpax. 24 hours later, John Ehrlichman insists Railpax is not an administration program and would not be sent to Capitol Hill. Within a week, Sen. Winston Prouty (R-VT) obtained the legislative language, concurred with Transportation Secretary John Volpe’s support of Railpax, “lined up the support of the Republican minority on the committee…and worked at selling Railpax to the Democratic majority.”18

1970 – Railpax passes the Senate 72-8 in May; passes the House in October, “and narrowly escaped being vetoed upon the recommendation of Ehrlichman and others of influence within and without the administration…If anyone is entitled to the distinction ‘father of Amtrak,’ it would have to be shared equally by Senator Prouty and Secretary Volpe.”18

October 30, 1970 – President Nixon signs Railpax into law.

May 1, 1971 – Amtrak begins operation

1973-74 – Amtrak survives the first of many “near-death” experiences. Haswell credits the energy crisis—that drove up Amtrak ridership—and Watergate—that reduced the Nixon Administration’s credibility.

1978 – The ICC’s Rail Services Planning Office conducts nationwide series of hearings on intercity passenger rail. The highest attendance was at Minot, North Dakota.

1979 – U.S. DOT in June backs off its “Final System Plan” that recommended a 43% reduction in the route structure, and supported a less drastic House committee version. On July 24, the House voted 214-197 against an amendment by then-Reps. Al Gore (D-TN) and Wyche Fowler (D-GA) to freeze the system, largely because Amtrak Chairman Alan Boyd said Amtrak lacked enough equipment to operate the entire system properly. The outcome:  October saw the route structure shrink by 14%, including elimination of Chicago-Florida Floridian; Chicago-Oklahoma-Texas Lone Star; New York-Columbus-St. Louis National Ltd.; Chicago-Billings-Seattle North Coast Hiawatha; and the Hilltopper across southern West Virginia.  Two major routes were added:  Los Angeles-Las Vegas-Salt Lake City-(east) Desert Wind and Portland-Boise-Ogden-(east) Pioneer (Both were dropped in May of 1997).

1980 – The Staggers Act extensively deregulates rail freight rates.  “The rail industry posted its biggest profits in a quarter-century during 1981.”4

October, 1981 – More modest Amtrak cuts with some silver linings.  Key items:

• Although San Antonio-Laredo service ended, and Chicago-Texas service was cut from daily to tri-weekly, the train’s San Antonio stop was moved from the infamous ‘rabbit patch’ to the station shared with the Sunset Ltd. and through cars were established Chicago-St. Louis-Dallas-San Antonio-Tucson-Phoenix-Los Angeles. 
• The Washington-Cumberland-Parkersburg-Cincinnati Shenandoah was replaced with a Washington-Cumberland-Pittsburgh-Chicago Capitol Ltd.  
• After a brief interval with no service, the Washington-Charleston WV-Cincinnati-Chicago Cardinal was restored as a tri-weekly rather than daily train, but with through cars extending service to New York City (an extension abandoned in 1996 and restored in October, 2003).

1982 – With conversion of Amtrak’s Silver Star, all passenger cars in revenue service have electric heating and air-conditioning, replacing steam heat and obsolete air-conditioning systems.

December 2, 1997 – President Clinton signs Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act into law.  Enactment of an authorization was prerequisite to Amtrak receiving over $2 billon in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, but the reform law starts Amtrak down a destructive path of investment in freight cars and operations, and in a fleet of Acela Express train sets for which there had been no prototype.

February, 2002 – Amtrak President & CEO George Warrington threatens October shutdown of long-distance trains if adequate funding not forthcoming from Congress

May, 2002 – David L. Gunn becomes president and CEO of Amtrak.

June 30, 2002 – Shutdown of entire system averted by loan and supplemental appropriation

October, 2003 – Amtrak announces record FY 2003 ridership of 24.0 million.  Long-distance trains were up 5.2% and short-distance trains up 2.2%.  Ridership strengthened during the year; comparable percentages for September were 9.7% and 4.2%.  Chicago-Detroit-Pontiac was up 8.9% for the year, 35.7% in September.  Michigan’s Pere Marquette, however, was strong all year—up 22.1%, a better showing than all other Amtrak routes except the Pacific Surfliners that were boosted by a major new joint ticketing agreement with Metrolink commuter rail, and Pennsylvanian which had a major restructuring and shift from a freight-friendly to a passenger-friendly schedule.

17—Daughen, Joseph R., and Peter Binzen, The Wreck of the Penn Central (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1971)
2—Ellis, Hamilton, The Pictorial Encyclopedia of Railways (Crown Publishers, Inc., New York, 1968)
13—Englund Jr., Carl R., former consultant and former New York Central official, addressing the NARP Board on October 7, 1983 (NARP News, January, 1984)
4—Goddard, Stephen B., Getting There:  The Epic Struggle Between Road and Rail in the American Century (BasicBooks, A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1994, New York)
18—Haswell, Anthony, quoted in National Assn. of Railroad Passengers News, February, 1975
5—Hilton, George W., Amtrak: The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, 1980) 
7– Klein, Maury, Union Pacific: Volume II, 1894-1969, (Doubleday, 1987; paperback: University of Minnesota Press, 2006)
1—Pangborn, J. G., The World’s Rail Way (Bramhall House, New York, 1894; and Crown Publishers, Inc., 1974)
3—Parmelee, Robert D., Chicago’s Railroads and Parmelee’s Transfer Company:  A Century of Travel (Golden Hill Press, Spencertown, NY; anticipated publication date November, 2006)
10—Perl, Anthony, New Departures: Rethinking Rail Passenger Policy in the 21st Century (The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2002)
6—Thompson, Gregory Lee, The Passenger Train in the Motor Age: California’s Rail and Bus Industries, 1910-1941 (Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1993)
12—U.S. Department of Transportation, Study of Federal Aid to Rail Transportation, January, 1977